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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
the ethical level of pest control operations; to serve merely as a
guardian against outright fraud and as a limiting agent in the
free play of competition would hardly justify its operations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CharZes A. Reynard*
The past term produced the customary share of decisions
involving constitutional issues. One of them, of extraordinary
significance, represents an apparent shift in the court's approach
to problems of substantive due process.' Two less significant
cases involved additional aspects of the due process clause as
well as the commerce clause and freedom of speech and the
press. Constitutional issues were also presented in three tax
cases 2 which are discussed in the section devoted to State and
Local Taxation.
In Schwegmann Brothers v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic
Beverage Control,3 by far the most important constitutional law
case of the term, the court set the hands of the judicial clock
back twenty years when it declared that the price-fixing provi-
sions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 19484 "are mani-
festly unreasonable within the contemplation of the state's police
power, and, hence, are unconstitutional in that they violate the
due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions."'. This,
to the knowledge of the writer, is the first decision of the court
to invalidate legislation on the ground of substantive due process
since 1930;6 it is the only one in its history to reject price-fixing
as a legitimate device for the regulation of the state's economic
welfare. Three other price-fixing statutes enacted by the legis-
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
2. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113(1950); State ex rel. Fontenot, Collector of Revenue v. Standard Dredging
Corp., 216 La. 509, 43 So. 2d 909 (1949); and DiGiovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La.
687, 44 So. 2d 818 (1950). See discussion of these cases, infra p. 214 et seq.
3. 216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
4. La. Act 360 of 1948 (La. R.S. [1950] 26:1 et seq.).
5. 216 La. 148, 182, 43 So. 2d 248, 259 (1949).
6. In City of Alexandria v. Hall, 171 La. 595, 131 So. 722 (1930), believed
to be the last decision to invalidate a regulation of economic affairs, the
court had held that "the requirement in the ordinance that barber shops
shall be closed at 6:30 p.m .... is not really an appropriate measure for the
protection of the public health, as the alleged necessity for the restriction in
the ordinance bears no reasonable relation to public health, is not supported
by anything of substance, but rests, in our opinion, upon mere conjecture."
171 La. 595, 601-602, 131 So. 722, 724. The statement in the text does not take




lature have been subjected to attack but sustained by the court
during the past twelve years.7
The act in question is comprehensive, designed to regulate
most, if not all, phases of the liquor traffic. In addition to its
mandatory mark-up-over-cost provisions it creates a board for
its administration, sets forth procedures and limitations for the
application for, granting and suspension of permits, makes pro-
vision for the payment of fees, and delegates authority to parishes
and municipalities to require annual permits and fees. In brief,
it is, as its purpose clause declares, an enactment adopted "so
that said traffic may not cause injury to the economic, social and
moral well-being of the people of the State." (Italics supplied.)
Plaintiff, a retail liquor dealer, had sold liquor at prices below
those required by the act; the board had ordered the suspension
of its permit, and it instituted proceedings to enjoin the board
from enforcing the order based upon the alleged unconstitution-
ality, inter alia, of the price-fixing provision of the act. This
provision, the plaintiff urged, "is aimed at the ordinary hazards
of competition incident to any business; price competition and
credit risks. It bears no real and substantial relation to the pub-
lic welfare, but is preferential legislation for certain favored
groups in the liquor industry."'8 The court itself considered the
questions raised by the case to be:
"Is there a real and substantial relation between the manda-
tory minimum mark ups of the statute and the preventing
of injury to the economic, social and moral well being of the
people of the state? Are those means [the mark ups] reas-
onably necessary and appropriate for the accomplishment of
the legitimate object or purpose which the statute announces
[regulation and control of the traffic] ?"
Even if we accept the requirement that there be a "real and
substantial relation" between the means adopted and the interest
to be protected, 10 it would seem reasonable to expect affirmative
7. La. Act 48 of 1936 (La. R.S. [1950] 37:411 et seq.), sustained in Board
of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938); The Fair
Trade Act (La. Act 13 of 1936 [La. R.S. (1950) 51:391 et seq.]), sustained in
Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942), and The
Unfair Sales Act (La. Act 338 of 1940, as amended [La. R.S. (1950) 51:421 et
seq.]), sustained in Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Association, Incorpo-
rated v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403 (1948).
8. 216 La. 148, 177, 43 So. 2d 248, 258 (1949).
9. Ibid.
10. The Supreme Court of the United States, which has not declared a
statute regulating economic affairs to be a violation of due process since
1937, imposes a less severe test. The post-1937 test adopted by the majority
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answers to these questions from the same court which had found
such a relationship to exist between "minimum price regulations
and the sanitation and hygiene standards required of barbers
S.. in the interest of public health and safety,"11 between legis-
lative authorization of price maintenance and the protection of
"the public against injurious and uneconomic practices in the
distribution of articles of standard quality under a distinguished
trade mark, brand, or name,' 2 and, finally, between a statutory
mandate that the retail price of "any merchandise" be fixed at
cost plus six per cent and the protection of the "public against
the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and
encourage competition by prohibiting unfair sales and discrim-
inatory practices by which fair and honest competition is de-
stroyed or prevented."1 3 Such an expectation seemed particularly
justified where, as here, the subject of regulation was the liquor
traffic, a favored object of legislative control since time immemo-
rial. One fairly obvious connection between the mandatory
mark ups and "the economic ... well-being of the people of the
State" is their tendency to prevent ruthless price competition
and the evils said to result therefrom-the very element so
heavily relied upon to sustain the Unfair Sales Act 1 4 and the
Fair Trade Act. 15
In the face of these strong precedents which have represented
the settled policy of the court in matters of substantive due
process for at least a dozen years, it struck down the statute,
saying that:
".. . there is no recitation in the statute revealing a legis-
lative finding that such a condition [cut-throat competition
and price wars] in the liquor traffic existed in Louisiana at
the time of or within a few years prior to the enactment of the
legislation. Neither does the evidence adduced at the trial
of this case conclusively disclose the existence thereof; at
the most it shows that several isolated price cutting inci-
of that Court is well stated in a 1944 case where it is said, "A violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . would depend upon whether there Is any
rational basis for the action of the legislature." Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas,
323 U.S. 32, 35 (1944). (Italics supplied.) Two of the present members of
the Court (Justices Black and Douglas) deny the existence of judicial limi-
tations of any character whatsoever in such cases. See Federal Power Com-
mission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (1942).
11. Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938).
12. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942).
13. Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Association, Incorporated v. Rosen-
zweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403 (1948).
14. Ibid.
15. Note 12 supra.
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dents between certain individuals occurred many years
before the adoption of the statute."'6
Leaving aside the fact that the legislature in this case had de-
clared a purpose to extend protection to the "economic ... well-
being of the people of the State," it is now well established that
the legislative devices of fact-finding and policy-declaring clauses
serve merely as interpretive aids to the courts and are wholly
inconclusive on the issue of constitutionality.17 Enactments con-
taining the most elaborate of such clauses have been declared
invalid, while others, omitting them, have been sustained. They
add little, if anything, to the universally accepted principle that
a presumption of validity attends all legislative enactments. A
statute must stand or fall upon the constitutional power of the
legislature irrespective of the avowed motive of enactment. It is
the second statement in the court's opinion quoted above that
causes real concern; that the evidence did not "conclusively dis-
close the existence" of price wars and other manifestations of
cut-throat competition. If, in its reference to the evidence, the
court means to imply that a person asserting the validity of a
statute must assume the burden of proof, a wholly new doctrine
of constitutional law has been adopted and the presumption of
validity cast aside. It is, of course, doubtful that the court in-
tended any such departure from traditional policy in this respect.
Yet it is extremely difficult to determine just what was other-
wise intended by the quoted sentence. It may mean that the
existence of an economic issue must be conclusively established
as a condition precedent to the further consideration of the con-
stitutional issues of the case. If so, the issue of constitutionality
is divided into two parts: the first involves an inquiry into the
existence or alleged existence of the condition which has moved
the legislature to act, and the second, an inquiry into the means
adopted to cope with that condition. This interpretation of the
judicial process in the instant case seems corroborated by the
subsequent language of the opinion. Had the court stopped at
this point, however, thus subdividing the inquiry and requiring
the supporters of the legislation conclusively to show the exist-
ence of an economic issue, the following clearly stated proposi-
16. 216 La. 148, 177-178, 43 So. 2d 248, 258 (1949).
17. Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). Recall the fate
of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 in Schechter Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), as well as that of the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), both of
which had extensive fact-finding and policy-declaring clauses.
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tion to the contrary in the Fair Trade Act decision would have
been overruled:
"The Legislature is vested with a large discretion in deter-
mining what the public interest requires and what measures
are necessary to protect that interest. Even in cases where
there is a dispute as to whether or not an economic question
is involved, and the Legislature has acted in respect thereto,
the courts will not disturb this exercise of a legislative
function.' 8 (Italics supplied.)
Whether influenced by these considerations or not, the court
did not rest its decision on the inconclusive nature of the evidence
offered to show past, present or likely future existence of price
wars and cut-throat competition. It gave the act the benefit of the
doubt on this point, saying:
"But assuming for the sake of argument that liquor price
wars are possible of occurrence in this state and that strin-
gent regulations to prevent them are needed, we do not agree
that the mandatory mark ups provided by Act 360 of 1948
constitute appropriate means for the achievement of that
purpose."
Standing alone, of course, this excerpt from the opinion is amaz-
ing! Amazing, first because it contradicts common knowledge-
a more effective method of preventing price wars than by the
device of mandatory mark ups over cost has not yet been de-
signed. Amazing, in the second place because it substitutes judi-
cial opinion for that of the legislative body in a matter which is
peculiarly within the province of the latter. Amazing, finally,
because the same court on two previous occasions had sustained
minimum price fixing statutes, the stated and acknowledged pur-
poses of which were to prevent price wars, cut-throat competi-
tion and the evils that attend such practices.19 Since the conclu-
sion quoted above was the basis for invalidating the statute, fair-
ness dictates a statement of the reason assigned by the court in its
support. The sole reason assigned was that the mandatory mark
up provisions did not extend to sales by manufacturers or distil-
lers, to sales of beer or to sales of liquor by the drink over the
bar. In other words, since the mandatory mark ups applied only
to wholesalers and retail dealers of packaged liquors, they were
regarded "inappropriate for the achievement of the legitimate
18. 200 La. 959, 979, 9 So. 2d 303, 309 (1942).
19. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) and
Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Association, Incorporated v. Rosenzweig,
214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403 (1948).
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object described in the statute. '20 Now it is submitted that the
plaintiff's real grievance, if any, concerning this aspect of the act
was a denial of equal protection, rather than due process-it as
well as other retailers, along with wholesalers, were being ac-
corded different treatment in the state's regulation of the liquor
traffic. It is submitted, however, that the classification thus
drawn is so eminently reasonable that it would in all likelihood
withstand any such attack. On the due process issue, however,
it must be conceded that the mandatory mark ups, applied to
wholesale and retail dealers of packaged liquors, did regulate a
very substantial portion of the liquor traffic. And if the language
of the Unfair Sales Act and Fair Trade Act decisions is to be
taken at face value, these mark ups had a real and substantial
relation to the "economic . . . well-being of the people of the
State," despite the fact that they did not apply to every aspect
of the liquor traffic. The Unfair Sales Act does not apply to sales
by manufacturers, and the Fair Trade Act applies solely to sales
of merchandise bearing distinctive trade marks, brands or names.
The same or similar considerations which moved the legislature
to limit the application of these other statutes were undoubtedly
present and taken into account when the act in the instant case
was adopted.2 1 It may be true that the failure to extend the
mark up provision to manufacturers and others made the act less
desirable. But due process does not compel the legislature to
furnish us with enactments that will receive universal acclaim
as being the best, wisest or most just. It simply demands that no
law be adopted which is manifestly arbitrary, whimsical or
capricious. Certainly these terms may not be applied to the act
in question and, significantly, the court refrained from doing so.
The opinion leaves the reader with the uncomfortable feeling
that it portends a return of the era when judges ruthlessly im-
posed their own notions over those of legislatures in determining
the need for and desirability of the regulation of the economic
affairs of the people. Viewed purely as a practical rather than a
legal matter, the writer agrees with the court's opinion. There
seems to be little doubt that the price-fixing provisions of the act
were undesirable, and were, in all probability, the result of lobby-
ing activity on behalf of the small group that would derive sub-
stantial benefits therefrom to the probable detriment of the
20. 216 La. 148, 182, 43 So. 2d 248, 259 (1949).
21. The testimony of one witness who was a proponent of the legislation
attests the practical impossibility of applying the mark-ups to drinks across
the bar. 216 La. 148, 181-182, 43 So. 2d 248, 259 (1949).
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consuming public.2 But these considerations are at least debat-
able and merely question the wisdom of the legislation. We
should not forget the admonition of the late Mr. Justice Murphy:
"The forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a
responsive legislature. '23
City of Alexandria v. Jones24 and City of Alexandria v.
Breard25 each involved appeals by house-to-house salesmen who
had been convicted under the provisions of the city's so-called
"Green River" ordinance 26 which declares such activity to be a
nuisance and forbids it unless the vendor has been requested or
invited to do so by the householder. In both cases the defendants
had admittedly engaged in conduct which was proscribed by the
ordinance; in both cases the validity of the enactment was assailed
on constitutional grounds; and in both cases the ordinance was
sustained.
In the Jones case the sole ground of attack was that the
ordinance offended the due process clauses of the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions. Breard, engaged in soliciting subscriptions for
magazines to be filled from out of state sources, also advanced
the due process defense, but in addition urged that the ordinance,
when applied to him, placed an undue and discriminatory burden
upon interstate commerce and abridged freedom of speech or
of the press contrary to state27 and federal 2s constitutional guar-
anties.
The due process argument is, of course, the most easily sur-
mountable obstacle of the cases and requires the court to do no
more than to acquiesce in the legislative judgment that public
safety and convenience demands that solicitors refrain from
22. This conjecture seems amply supported by the fact that "Joining the
defendant in urging the constitutionality of the statute were the Louisiana
Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association and the Louisiana Retail Liquor
Dealers Association, as well as numerous individual wholesale and retail
liquor dealers .... Also intervening, but supporting the position of plaintiff,
were seven New Orleans citizens who alleged themselves to be representative
of the great body of consumers in this state .. " 216 La. 148, 155, 156, 43 So.
2d 248, 250 (1949).
23. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
24. 216 La. 923, 45 So. 2d 79 (1950).
25. 47 So. 2d 553 (La. 1950).
26. The ordinance takes its name from the town of Green River, Wyo-
ming, which was apparently the first to adopt a measure in the form here
involved, and which has since been adopted by hundreds of other municipali-
ties throughout the nation. The original ordinance was sustained against
attack on constitutional grounds in Fuller Brush Co. v. Town of Green
River, 60 F. 2d 613 (C.A. 10th 1932), affirmed in 65 F. 2d 112 (C.A. 10th 1933).
27. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 3.
28. U.S. Const. Amend. I, as made applicable to the states through
Amend. XIV, § 1.
1951]
204 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XI
making uninvited visits to private residences. The court itself
viewed the ordinance as "a protective measure, conceived and
designed to give the occupants of the home ... and their prop-
erty additional security against the depredations of the lawless,
who often under the guise of soliciting or peddling gain entrance
for the purpose of (a) planning a future crime or (b) perpetrat-
ing a crime immediately," 29 although, as in Schwegmann,30 the
legislation contained no recital that the suppression of these vices
was an objective of the enactment, and some persons have
charged that this type of ordinance is simply preferential legis-
lation favoring local merchants. Nor did the court embark upon
an inquiry into the necessity for or appropriateness of the means
adopted to accomplish this legislative purpose, despite the fact
that Section 3 exempts "soliciting of orders for the sale of milk,
dairy products, vegetables, poultry, eggs and other farm and
garden products," thus eliminating a substantial segment of the
peddling public from the regulation so imposed. For the reasons
advanced at some length in the discussion of the Schwegmann
81
opinion, the writer regards the due process issue in these two
cases to be correctly decided.
The defense of the commerce clause, raised by the Breard
case, presents a more disputed issue, but upon the basis of the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, "the
final arbiter"32 of that question, it appears to have been properly
rejected. It should first be noted that the ordinance is non-
discriminatory; it applies to all uninvited solicitation whether it
involves interstate or intrastate implications. Since there are
numerous solicitors of both classes, the principle of discrimina-
tion invoked in Best & Company v. Maxwell18 is not applicable.
Similarly, the principle of the "drummer cases"3 4 seems inappro-
priate as those cases involved efforts of states and municipalities
29. 47 So. 2d 553, 555 (La. 1950).
30. Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
31. Ibid.
32. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
33. 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
34. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Rodgers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401
(1913); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S.
697 (1915); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914); Dozier v. Alabama, 218
U.S. 124 (1910); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906); Caldwell v.
North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902);
Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129
(1888); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Corson v. Maryland, 120
U.S. 502 (1887), and Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489
(1887).
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to tax, license or bond the itinerant vendor, thereby exacting
monetary contributions which, in practical operation, placed such
a heavy burden on the conduct of commerce as to burden seri-
ously if not to eradicate it. ". . . attempts at such taxation have
always been more carefully scrutinized and more consistently
resisted than police power regulations of aspects of commerce."3 5
This is not to say, of course, that the negative implications of
the commerce clause have no application to the police powers of
the state. "Reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power," stated former Chief Justice Stone, is to be
achieved by "appraisal and accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved."3 6 And in
the course of such reconciliation, the court, speaking through
Justice Stone, concluded that the states might regulate the width
of trucks moving over their highways in interstate commerce,
but could not regulate the length of interstate trains. The inter-
ests of public safety and convenience in the former situation out-
weighed the national interest, but not in the latter. It is sub-
mitted that Alexandria's interest in abating the nuisance which
prompted the enactment of the ordinance in question outweighs
the national interest involved, and that the appeal which has
been taken to the United States Supreme Court37 on that point
should be affirmed.
On the final point of defense, that predicated upon the guar-
anties of free speech or press, considerable doubt might have
attended the decision had it not been for the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in American Communi-
cations Association v. Douds. 38 It had never been contended that
these freedoms were absolute, but at least until the Douds case
it was thought that restrictions might be imposed only in the
face of clear and present danger, and that one whose rights were
so abridged might show that no emergency existed which justi-
fied the restriction. In that decision, however, the court accepted
congressional judgment regarding the existence of an emergency,
and also held that the danger to be protected against need not be
a danger to the nation. Thus Congress was permitted to abridge
free speech to the extent of requiring an oath, both as to personal
conduct and beliefs, as well as to the beliefs of an organization as
a means of regulating interstate commerce. If this approach is
35. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
36. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-769 (1945).
37. Appeal filed on November 2, 1950, probable jurisdiction noted, Decem-
ber 11, 1950, Docket Number 399.
38. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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to be followed, a city council seems justified in similarly abridg-
ing speech and press in the exercise of its police power directed
toward the protection of its citizens and their property which it
has properly found to be endangered.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Jerome J. Shestack*
Over two hundred years ago Thomas Madox wrote that
the subject matter of corporated towns and communities is
extensive and difficult.' The years have not denied this observa-
tion. On the contrary, time has brought added complexity. The
available rules have simply not met the needs of an ever-
enlarging field.2 In the last term of the supreme court the local
government cases proved no exception. Although generally
reaching what appear to be sound results, the language of the
opinions often presents perplexities that should elicit no enthu-
siasm from those concerned with municipal law.
ELECTION OF ORDINANCES
The question of what form a proposition must take when
submitted to the electors of a municipality was raised in two
cases.
In Holt v. Vernon Parish School Board3 a proposition was
submitted to the voters of a school district ward to incur debt
and issue obligations "for the purpose of constructing and equip-
ping a gymnasium-auditorium, lunch room, and repairing present
school buildings" in the district. In State ex rel. Bussie v. Fant,4
relators attempted to force the city council to submit to the elec-
tors of the city an ordinance raising the salaries of fire depart-
ment employees ten cents an hour and police department
employees fifteen cents an hour.
In each case it was contended that the proposition in ques-
tion was illegal in that it contained more than one proposition
without affording the electors an opportunity to vote on each one
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Thomas Madox, Historical Essay Concerning. the Cities, Towns and
Buroughs of England, taken from Records (1726) quoted in Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, preface (5 ed. 1911) and in Harris, Municipal Corporations, 5
Rutgers L. Rev. 76 (1950).
2. A malady not localized of course to local government law.
3. 217 La. 1, 45 So. 2d 745 (1950).
4. 216 La. 58, 43 So. 2d 217 (1949).
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